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Since the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 
mid-2011, the Eurosystem has eased its monetary policy signifi-
cantly. Thus, official interest rates were cut on three occasions 
(November and December 2011 and June 2012) by a total of 75 
basis points (bp) and the rate applied to the main refinancing ope-
rations reached 0.75%. Additionally, a series of non-conventional 
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measures were taken, including most notably: the revival of the 
government bond purchase programme in August 2011, the ap-
proval of a second covered bond purchase programme in Novem-
ber of that same year, the extension of the assets eligible as colla-
teral in the Eurosystem’s liquidity injecting operations on several 
occasions and, especially, the long-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) in December 2011 and February 2012 and the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) programme in September 2012.
Due to the foregoing, the three-month interbank market interest 
rates fell to levels of around 0.20% and the twelve-month ones to 
0.55% (down 135 bp and 155 bp, respectively, on August 2011). 
These loose monetary conditions have also fed through to other 
markets in the core euro area countries (Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, etc.), resulting in a more or less 
widespread decline in the financing costs of private and public 
agents as shown, for example, by the current historically low ten-year 
government bond yields in Germany and France (below 1.5% and 
around 2%, respectively, some 100 bp lower than in August 2011).
By contrast, these monetary conditions have fed through to a 
much lesser degree to the euro area countries most affected by 
recent tensions, which include Spain. For instance, the yield on 
Spanish ten-year government bonds held at the beginning of April 
2013 at 60 bp lower than in August 2011, although a more marked 
improvement has occurred with respect to the situation at the be-
ginning of summer 2012, when on occasions it exceeded 7% (see 
Panel 1 of the accompanying chart). Since then, the various deci-
sions of the Eurosystem and the national and European economic 
authorities have triggered a drop of more than 200 bp in the spread 
with Germany which, nevertheless, remains above 300 bp as it has 
done throughout this period. These developments also condition 
the availability and cost of borrowed funds for private agents.
Since June-July 2012, private agents’ access to wholesale mar-
kets has also clearly improved (see Panel 2 of the accompanying 
chart). However, once again here, the costs of debt financing (ap-
proximated by CDS premia) remained significantly higher than 
those seen for the euro area as a whole.
The above conclusion is strengthened even further when analy-
sing households’ and non-financial corporations’ borrowing costs 
via bank loans in Spain, the latter being the main source of bo-
rrowed funds for private agents in our country. As shown in the 
two central panels of the accompanying chart, the easing of mo-
netary policy in the euro area since mid-2011 has fed through to a 
very limited extent to Spanish credit institutions’ customers. Thus, 
while for the core euro area countries average interest rates at the 
beginning of 2013 were clearly lower than those in August 2011 
(between 90 bp and 105 bp, except for consumer loans to house-
holds, which remained at the same level), in Spain they stood, with 
the exception of loans for house purchase, above the levels then 
prevailing and above those in the core euro area countries. The 
increases are particularly notable in household consumer loans 
(85 bp) and in corporate loans of less than €250,000 (75 bp), which 
is an approximation of the borrowing costs of SMEs, given the 
typically lower value of loans to this type of companies. There was 
a decline in the cost of housing finance in this same period (45 bp), 
which was, nevertheless, lower than that seen in the other coun-
tries analysed (90 bp).
The Spanish banks’ responses to the Eurosystem’s Bank Lending 
Survey also show the demanding nature of households’ and com-
panies’ financing conditions both in terms of prices and quantities 
(see lower panels of the accompanying chart). Thus, lending stan-
dards for new loans, after having tightened notably in 2007-2009, 
are estimated to have either remained relatively stable or to have 
tightened further since then. Credit conditions, according to the 
same survey, are also estimated to have become, during the last 
two years, more unfavourable for borrowers, particularly as re-
gards the margins applied and other non-interest-related expenses.
This lack of pass-through (or incomplete pass-through) of the ex-
pansionary monetary impulses in Spain (as well as in other coun-
tries also affected by the recent financial strains) partly reflects the 
Spanish economy’s more unfavourable position in the cycle, which 
justifies slightly higher risk premia. An indication of this is the fact 
that the differences observed in the behaviour of bank lending ra-
tes are particularly pronounced in riskier operations (due to their 
generally higher probability of default and lack of guarantees), 
such as consumer loans and lending to SMEs. However, the diffe-
rences seen are of a very great magnitude and it is difficult to 
justify them exclusively in terms of cyclical divergences. The finan-
cial crisis has prompted a pronounced fragmentation of the euro 
area’s financial system which has particularly affected banks in 
different countries, whose financing costs have tended to move 
sharply into line with developments in sovereign risks and relati-
vely independently from the individual situation of each bank. This 
has translated into financing costs for banks (and, consequently, 
for the private agents they finance) that are too high for the single 
monetary policy stance in those economies which, like Spain’s, 
have been hardest hit by the financial strains.
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